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Deacon develops a minimal model of a nonparasitic virus to explore how nucleotide 12 
sequences came to be characterized by a code-like informational at the origin of life. The 13 
model serves to problematize the concept of biological normativity because it highlights two 14 
common yet typically implicit assumptions: (1) that life could consist as an inert form, were 15 
it not for extrinsic sources of physical instability, and (2) that life could have originated as a 16 
singular self-contained individual. I propose that the origin of life, the genetic code, and 17 
biological normativity more generally, lead us to reject this passive individualism. 18 
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 22 
Deacon (2021) addresses the question of how complex organic molecules, such as the 23 
nucleotide sequences that make up RNA and DNA, first came to be characterized by a code-24 
like informational codependence in the context of the origin of life. This return to the origin 25 
of life is a strategic move by Deacon, which serves the purpose of developing a minimal 26 
model of a possible physical implementation of what he calls, following the tradition of 27 
biosemiotics, the “interpretation” of sign vehicles. Deacon’s approach aligns closely with the 28 
enactive approach to autopoiesis and adaptivity – living is sense-making at its core and from 29 
its very start (Thompson, 2007). Yet there are also some productive differences between 30 
these approaches that are worth exploring in more detail. 31 
 32 
The most fundamental difference lies in distinct criteria of what would count as a successful 33 
explanation. Deacon adheres to a narrow form of naturalism, in which the only permissible 34 
explanatory factors are those captured by the natural sciences. The enactive approach tends 35 
to adopt a more relaxed form of naturalism, in which the subjective side of life can also 36 
make a difference in its own right, including normatively, to how its behavior unfolds 37 
(Hanna & Maiese, 2009). It is this qualitative transition from non-normative to normative, 38 
which is a transition that goes beyond mere chemistry, that is at the root of why the origin 39 
of life remains such an intractable problem. Researchers in artificial life and synthetic 40 
biology pursuing the creation of life from scratch are faced by a profound challenge: to 41 
create a novel system that is sensitive to a normativity that is not derived, like that of all our 42 
other artifacts, but is intrinsic to that system (Froese & Taguchi, 2019).  43 
 44 
How did intrinsic normativity originate in nature? An important clue can be found in the fact 45 
that living systems must continually do work – metabolically and regulatorily – to even exist 46 
(Kauffman, 2000). In contrast to events in purely physical systems, which merely happen 47 
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without any sense of their consequences, activity in biological systems essentially involves 48 
doing things for a purpose, i.e., trying or striving, which implies a normative condition for 49 
their consequences, especially for the possibility of continued existence. The doings of the 50 
living ultimately matter to the living because of mortality: the possibility of success or failure 51 
is intrinsically related to possibility of life or death (Froese, 2017). Indifference is not option. 52 
 53 
Thus, the origin of life does not consist only in an increase in the complexity of chemical 54 
organization; it is also the point at which biological normativity for the first time comes to 55 
play a role on our planet, and possibly in the whole universe. To do justice to this qualitative 56 
transition it will be necessary, first, to make conceptual room in the natural sciences such 57 
that normativity can make a difference on its own terms, beyond the determinations 58 
derived from its physical implementation. Second, there is still the unresolved challenge to 59 
explain how this initial form of life, with its basic normativity of doing for the sake of being, 60 
increases in complexity in an open-ended manner. For this latter part, it will become crucial 61 
to explain the origin of the genetic code.  62 
 63 
In what follows I will mainly focus on the more philosophical aspects of the first issue, and I 64 
will finish by sketching some of the implementation aspects of the second issue. 65 
 66 
On the basis and efficacy of normativity 67 
 68 
Deacon positions his model as a counterpoint to classic modern biology, as epitomized by 69 
Dawkins’ “selfish gene” and the “RNA World” scenario of the origin of life, which reduces 70 
the process of interpretation of information to mere molecular replication. His ambition is 71 
to develop an alternative to this reductionist position by making it intelligible how a 72 
molecular structure, which in itself is just a physical pattern, could have informational 73 
content, i.e., be about something.1 And this in turn leads Deacon to develop his model as a 74 
minimal physical implementation of the process of interpretation.  75 
 76 
The core of Deacon’s “autogen” model is the self-organizing dynamics of two codependent 77 
processes, reciprocal catalysis and capsid self-assembly. It is therefore a variation on the 78 
familiar theme of bounded self-production, which includes a long and venerable tradition of 79 
proposals at various levels of abstraction, including “autopoiesis” (Varela, Maturana, & 80 
Uribe, 1974), “autocatakinetic closure” (Swenson, 2000), “autonomous agent” (Kauffman, 81 
2000), “basic autonomy” (Ruiz-Mirazo & Moreno, 2004), and the “metabolism-repair (M-R) 82 
system” (Rosen, 1991). Luisi (2006) provides an extensive review of such “metabolism-first” 83 
approaches to the origin of life, including of the many efforts to realize their physical 84 
implementation. It is a pity that Deacon does not engage more with this extant literature, 85 
because it remains unclear in which precise respects his “autogen” model is an advance 86 
over the state of the art in this field with respect to grounding normativity.  87 
 88 
What is innovative about Deacon’s proposal is to cast bounded self-production in terms of 89 
Peirce’s theory of signs. He provides a step-by-step semiotic theory of the normativity 90 
 
1 I side with Hutto and Myin (2013) that the states of basic minds, including of minimal lifeforms, are strictly 
speaking contentless because they are not “about” anything in a strong semantic sense, e.g. involving truth 
conditions. But we all agree that basic minds can nevertheless be intentionally directed at aspects of the 
world, and this is sufficient common ground for the current discussion. 
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involved at the transition from the origin of life to the origin of the genetic code. Another 91 
conceptual novelty of Deacon’s proposal is that he explicitly defines his model of bounded 92 
self-production as a kind of non-parasitic virus. This has the virtue of highlighting that, at the 93 
system level, self-producing systems can be characterized by an inert form, which reveals a 94 
hidden tension with Deacon’s appeal to active adaption as the basis of normativity.  95 
 96 
Deacon is not alone with this problem. The identification of the default state with an inert 97 
state is also a feature of famous cybernetic models of adaptation, including ultrastability 98 
and classic autopoiesis (Froese & Stewart, 2010). In Deacon’s model, the initial state even 99 
consists in a stop of all processes inside a static capsid with an “inert form”. Hence, catalysis 100 
and self-assembly are only temporary reactions to an “extrinsic disruption” that led to the 101 
loss of boundary integrity. At an abstract level, this model belongs to the class of generic 102 
physical systems that when pushed out of stable equilibrium by independent factors will 103 
mount counteracting forces that allow it to reconverge. It can therefore be doubted 104 
whether this kind of extrinsically caused reactivity is sufficient for Deacon to attribute to the 105 
system any kind of intrinsic activity. If this shift from extrinsic to intrinsic cannot be secured, 106 
the model would be lacking the most essential ingredient on which Deacon’s semiotic 107 
notion of normativity depends.  108 
 109 
As a comparative case, consider Deacon’s rejection of selectionist accounts as inadequate 110 
for grounding active adaptation and normativity, given that “the ‘external’ environment 111 
does all the work”. The question is therefore how to characterize the condition of the living 112 
such that it is not subject to similar criticisms. The three-decade history of the enactive 113 
approach reflects the search for an answer to this question, which has resulted in a more 114 
refined understanding of intrinsic activity. 115 
 116 
The idea that boundary repair could serve as the basis for normativity goes back to the very 117 
initial formulations of the enactive approach. Consider Varela’s proposal that autopoiesis 118 
can serve as the basis for a biology of “intentionality”. It is precisely the concept of a 119 
“breakdown” of an otherwise static identity, and the system’s initiation of an adaptive 120 
response, which motivates the claim that a meaningful world shows up for the organism: 121 
 122 
“The source for this world-making is always the breakdowns in autopoiesis, be they 123 
minor, like changes in concentration of some metabolite, or major, like disruption of 124 
the boundary. Due to the nature of autopoiesis itself – illustrated in the membrane 125 
repair of the minimal simulated example above – every breakdown can be seen as 126 
the initiation of an action on what is missing on the part of the system so that 127 
identity might be maintained.” (Varela, 1992) 128 
 129 
Like Deacon’s model, Varela’s initial proposal can therefore also be criticized as insufficient 130 
for active adaptation. However, since then several conceptual advances have been made, 131 
which can be briefly summarized as follows.  132 
 133 
First, there was an explicit recognition that a proper grounding of normativity requires that 134 
the source of the system’s vulnerability to disruption has to be expanded from the extrinsic 135 
environment to the intrinsic constitution of the living, which came to be referred to as their 136 
“precariousness” (Weber & Varela, 2002). Second, it was recognized that a graded and 137 
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differentiated perspective of sense-making required a system capable of more states than 138 
self and non-self. In contrast to Deacon’s claim that this “zeroth” level of semiosis would 139 
include “a sign of non self”, not even this is given: everything would have an absolutely 140 
positive sense (as long as “self” exists) or absolutely no sense at all (no “self” exists). One 141 
proposal for grounding a range of normativity was that the system is sensitive to the relative 142 
amount of effort that is required for its adaptive response to keep the state of its essential 143 
variables away from its boundary of viability (Di Paolo, 2005). Third, adaptivity was rooted in 144 
the instability of bounded self-production as such. There is an irreducible tension in the 145 
system between satisfying the needs of self-individuation or boundedness (being as closed 146 
as possible to the environment) and the needs of self-production (being as open as possible 147 
to the environment). This enables us to define active adaptation as the spontaneous change 148 
of system configurations whereby the mutually exclusive conditions of bounded self-149 
production are iteratively and always only partially resolved (Di Paolo, 2018). A key move, 150 
therefore, is to characterize the default state of the living system as intrinsically unstable, 151 
which at the same time enables us to characterize it as intrinsically active.  152 
 153 
This still leaves open the bigger mystery of how these spontaneous reconfigurations of the 154 
system are subject to normative regulation as such. How does the value associated with 155 
satisfying normative conditions enter this scenario? A clue is that the irreducible partialness 156 
of each of the adopted configurations points to an essential incompleteness at the core of 157 
the living, which also resonates with Deacon’s (2012) own emphasis on the incompleteness 158 
of nature when we probe it for phenomena of intentionality. Pushing these ideas further, 159 
we could start to view the role of normativity not as a specific cause, which is always in 160 
danger of collapsing into just another physical determination, but rather as precisely the 161 
relative absence or bracketing of physical determination (Froese & Taguchi, 2019). The 162 
physical indeterminacy that would be associated with normative dependencies could then 163 
be measured in terms of uncertainty measures like entropy. Intriguingly, this suggests a new 164 
way of considering the link between the origin of life and the principle of maximum entropy 165 
production, which deserve to be explored in more detail elsewhere. 166 
 167 
There are additional implications for placing instability and incompleteness at the core of 168 
the living: once this dynamic interplay between openness and closedness becomes part of 169 
the system’s own regulatory process, the concept of a rigid boundary, like a capsid, is no 170 
longer an appropriate model. A more permeable boundary, like a chemical gradient, may be 171 
a more suitable starting point for this active system-environment interaction (Froese, Virgo, 172 
& Ikegami, 2014). But such fluidity brings along its own challenges of adaptability and 173 
evolvability, which depends on more solid molecular structures, so perhaps life originated 174 
on the surface of droplets (Sharov, 2016). From this more dynamic starting point, a key step 175 
in the increase of system complexity will have to do with increasing state-dependence of 176 
internal and interactive behavior. In line with Deacon’s proposal, this suggests that the 177 
genetic system first started as a stable memory system, which only later became involved in 178 
transmission across generations. But, as he also recognizes, this still falls short of explaining 179 
the origins of the genetic code. There is a missing mechanism that can account for the 180 
transition from an individual’s memory system to a cross-generational genetic system.  181 
 182 
A possible mechanism for the origin of the genetic code that is consistent with Deacon’s 183 
proposal is based on horizontal gene transfer. Simulation models show that even molecular 184 
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sequences with an initially arbitrary association between genes and proteins spontaneously 185 
take on a code-like structure, as long as they are iteratively passed between systems that 186 
only partially acquire its correlational mapping, similar to the iterated learning paradigm in 187 
language evolution (Froese, Campos, Fujishima, Kiga, & Virgo, 2018). This iterative approach 188 
seems to be in tension with the fitness cost of changing the mappings of the genetic code, 189 
which is why some favor scenarios wherein a static code originates as a whole like a frozen 190 
accident. But the highly ordered nature of the genetic code makes that scenario highly 191 
unlikely, and the worry about costly changes could be addressed by envisioning a scenario 192 
initially involving non-deleterious changes, including an expansion of the code by increasing 193 
the number of nucleotide “letters” (Frank & Froese, 2018).  194 
 195 
This model of the origin of the genetic code is suggestive, but it leaves several key questions 196 
unsolved. First, it requires a spatially contained population of proto-living systems at a 197 
relatively advanced stage of complexity, which runs counter to Deacon’s claim that life 198 
“arose by accident”. However, there are compelling pre-biological mechanisms that could 199 
account for their “design”, such as population-level proto-cell optimization in the wet-dry 200 
cycles of Archaean ponds (Damer, 2016). Second, the model leaves unclear the origin of 201 
horizontal gene transfer. An intriguing possibility is suggested by Deacon’s development of 202 
Dyson’s two-stage origin of the genetic code, according to which nucleotides first stored and 203 
transported chemical energy in nonreactive forms, and these molecules only later acquired 204 
code-like properties. Horizontal gene transfer can then be conceived as originating in the 205 




More work clearly needs to be done to flesh out all these ideas. Yet, taken together, it is 210 
evident that they are pointing in a very different direction than the passive individualism 211 
implied by the “autogen” model. Rather than grounding normativity by starting from a 212 
static, solitary, and self-contained system, we are left with a sense of the fundamental role 213 
of intrinsic instability, openness, and interactivity. This suggests that we should consider an 214 
altogether different starting point. For instance, a more suitable proposal for the origin of 215 
life could be in terms of the emergence of an organic geosphere: a global network of 216 
chemical reactions that was particularly suited to reducing the energetic gradients that had 217 
been produced by the pre-organic geosphere (Smith & Morowitz, 2016). This leads to a final 218 
speculation: perhaps zero-level normativity first originated along with this whole biosphere, 219 
which maximized energy flow via self-production, and it only later complexified in terms of 220 
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